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Abstract 
This paper aims to generate new theoretical and empirical insights into the way states and policies 
shape migration processes in their interaction with other migration determinants in receiving and 
sending countries. More fundamentally, this state of-the-art reveals a still limited understanding of 
the forces driving migration. Although there is consensus that macro-contextual economic and 
political factors and meso-level factors such as networks all play ‘some’ role, there is no agreement 
on their relative weight and mutual interaction. To start filling that gap, this paper outlines the 
contours of a conceptual framework for generating improved insights into the ways states and 
policies shape migration processes in their interaction with structural migration determinants in 
receiving and sending countries. First, it argues that the fragmented insights from different 
disciplinary theories can be integrated in one framework through conceptualizing virtually all forms 
of migration as a function of capabilities and aspirations. Second, to increase conceptual clarity it 
distinguishes the preponderant role of states in migration processes from the hypothetically more 
marginal role of specific immigration and emigration policies. Subsequently, it hypothesizes four 
different ‘substitution effects’ which can partly explain why polices fail to meet their objectives. 
This framework will serve as a conceptual guide for the determinants of international migration 
research. 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper outlines the scientific rationale of this 
project by analysing the main gaps in migration 
policy and migration determinants research. It 
outlines the contours of a conceptual framework and 
a set of hypotheses for generating improved insights 
into the ways states and policies shape migration 
processes in their interaction with structural 
migration determinants in receiving and sending 
countries, which will guide the determinants of 
international migration project. In wealthy countries, 
immigration, in particular of low-skilled and 
culturally distinct people from poorer countries, is 
increasingly perceived as a problem in need of 
control. The common – but not unproblematic – 
perception is that policy-makers have reacted to this 
pressure by implementing restrictive immigration 
policies and increasing border controls (Massey et al. 
1998).  
However, the effectiveness of such policies has been 
often contested in the face of their oft-supposed 
failure to significantly affect the level of immigration 
and their hypothesized unintended, perverse and 
often counterproductive effects such as pushing 
migrants into permanent settlement, discouraging 
return and encouraging irregular movements and 
migration through alternative legal or geographical 
channels (Castles 2004b; Grütters 2003). However, 
other scholars have argued that, on the whole, state 
policies have been largely effective (Brochmann & 
Hammar 1999; Strikwerda 1999), which also seems 
to be partly confirmed by a limited number of 
quantitative studies indicating that specific policy 
interventions can have a significant effect on 
migration flows.  
Despite apparently increasing immigration 
restrictions, the volume of South–North migration 
has only increased over the past few decades. But 
does this mean that migration policies have failed and 
that states are generally unable to control migration? 
Not necessarily. First of all, we should not confuse 
statistical association with causality, which is 
particularly difficult to establish because we 
generally lack counterfactual cases. For instance, one 
might argue that the migration-reducing effects of 
immigration restrictions are counterbalanced by the 
migration-increasing effects of growing economic 
gaps between sending and receiving countries or 
economic growth in receiving countries, or the lifting 
of exit restrictions by origin countries.  
Hence, sustained or increasing migration does not 
necessarily prove policy ineffectiveness – as 
migration volumes might have been higher without 
migration controls. The other way around, a decrease 
in migration does not prove the policy successful – 
although politicians are generally eager to make such 
claims – as such a decrease might for instance also be 
the result of economic growth or an end of conflict in 
origin countries, or an economic recession in 
destination countries. So, finding better 
methodological approaches to establish (multiple) 
causality constitutes the first challenge facing 
research on this issue. 
Besides the huge difficulties involved in ‘proving’ 
causality as such, a second challenge is to bring more 
precision in research by assessing the relative 
importance of immigration policies compared to the 
effects of other migration determinants. After all, it 
can hardly be surprising that most policies 
discouraging or encouraging particular 
manifestations of migration will have ‘some’ effect. 
The real question is about the relative magnitude of 
this effect compared to macro-contextual migration 
determinants, which will eventually also determine 
the effectiveness and efficiency of policies. Although 
some studies assert a statistical relation between 
certain policy measures and particular migration 
flows, the relative importance of policy effects 
compared to the effects of other migration 
determinants remains largely unclear.  
It is one thing to find that restrictions on, say, lows 
killed labour migration have a significant effect on 
decreasing inflows, but the real question is how large 
this effect is compared to the effect of other factors 
such as economic growth, employment, violent 
political conflict and personal freedoms. If the latter 
factors explain most variance in migration, one might 
for instance conclude that policies have a certain, but 
also limited effect on overall volumes and trends of 
migration. In other words, if most variance in 
migration is explained by structural migration 
determinants or other policies, the margin of 
manoeuvre for migration policies is fundamentally 
limited. 
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In addition to finding better ways to measure the 
existence and relative magnitude of policy effects, a 
third, related, challenge is to improve insights into the 
very nature and evolution of migration policies. There 
seems to be reason to question the general assertion 
that migration policies have become more restrictive 
over the past decades. Although this idea is often 
taken for granted, the diverse and multiple nature of 
migration policies raises questions about our ability 
and utility to measure ‘overall’ levels of 
restrictiveness, and even about the overall assumption 
that policies have become more restrictive.  
While several countries have raised barriers for 
particular categories of migrants (for instance, low-
skilled workers and asylum seekers), not all countries 
have done so, and immigration of other categories has 
often been facilitated. Changes in migration policy 
typically facilitate the entry of particular origin 
groups while simultaneously restricting the entry of 
other groups. For instance, ‘Fortress Europe’ may be 
an adequate metaphor to characterize policies 
towards asylum seekers and refugees (Hatton 2004), 
but seems inappropriate to characterize the 
immigration policies of EU or OECD countries as a 
whole. 
Another example is the US Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1965, which ‘equalized’ 
immigration policies by ending positive 
discrimination of European immigrants and 
contributing to increasing non-European migration. 
This also reveals the strong Eurocentric bias 
underlying common views that migration to the USA, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand was largely 
‘free’ until at least the mid twentieth century (Hatton 
& Williamson 1998) – it may have been relatively 
free for Europeans, but this was certainly not the case 
for Asians or Africans, for whom recent reforms have 
meant a liberalization. Also countries’ membership 
and accession to regional blocks such as the European 
Union typically coincides with liberalization of 
migration of citizens of member states, while 
immigration restrictions for ‘third-country’ nationals 
are sustained or further tightened (Mannan & Krueger 
1996).  
Because migration policies typically consist of a 
‘mixed bag’ of various measures targeting particular 
groups of immigrants, there is a considerable risk of 
over-generalizing. While migration policies are likely 
to affect patterns of migration selectivity, the impact 
on the overall magnitude of migration flows is more 
uncertain as these are strongly affected by other 
macro-structural factors, while migrants’ agency and 
strategies tend to create meso-level structures which 
facilitate migration over formally closed borders. 
Since state policies simultaneously constrain or 
enable immigration and emigration of particular 
groups along particular geographical pathways, states 
perhaps play a more significant role in structuring 
emigration through influencing the (initial) 
composition and spatial patterns of migration, rather 
than in affecting overall volumes and long-term 
trends, which, particularly in liberal democracies, 
appear to be primarily affected by other, economic, 
social and cultural migration determinants (Mannan 
& Krueger 1998). 
These examples show that any serious inquiry into the 
effect of migration policies not only needs to define 
the concept, but also to ‘unpack’ or disaggregate 
‘migration policies’ into the multitude of laws, 
measures and regulations states deploy in their 
attempts to regulate immigration and emigration 
along categories that are based on national origin and 
further characteristics such as gender, age, education, 
occupation and officially defined main migration 
motives. As migration policies are typically affected 
and shaped by different, often opposed, interests, 
policies are typically internally incoherent, which 
further emphasizes the need to break down policies 
into the specific measures and regulations they 
comprise. 
In addition, conventional views of increasing 
migration policy restrictiveness typically ignore 
emigration policies pursued by origin states, which 
are as diverse and multiple as immigration policies, 
but which seem to have become less restrictive 
overall. Only a declining number of strong, 
authoritarian states with closed economies are willing 
and capable of imposing blanket exit restrictions. 
Paradoxically, while an increasing number of, 
particularly developing, countries seem to aspire to 
regulate emigration, their capability to do so is 
fundamentally and increasingly limited by legal 
(human rights), economic and political constraints. 
The ability of governments to affect overall 
immigration and emigration levels seems to decrease 
as the level of authoritarianism goes down. This also 
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reveals the need to look beyond the role of migration 
policies per se and to explore the ways in which states 
affect the migration process more generally. 
1.2 RESEARCH APPROACH 
So, the crucial question remains: how do states and 
policies shape migration processes independently of 
and in their interaction with other migration 
determinants in receiving and sending countries? Due 
to serious methodological and theoretical flaws, 
scholarly research has so far hardly been able to 
produce convincing answers to these questions, and 
the second and third questions in particular. The 
inconclusive nature of this debate reveals an overall 
lack of conceptual, analytical and empirical rigour in 
the study of migration policy effects. Most existing 
evidence is descriptive, biased and partial, which is 
related to the weak embedding of migration policies 
research into general theories on the causes of 
migration. 
In this context, it is important to emphasize that the 
limited of capacity of research to answer these key 
questions is not exclusively linked to limitations of 
data and statistical models, but also to the rather weak 
theoretical foundations of ‘push-pull’ or gravity 
models which are routinely, but uncritically, used for 
studying migration determinants. For the very reason 
that they are often not grounded in migration theory, 
they tend to ignore or fail to properly specify several 
theoretically important migration determinants in 
receiving and, particularly, sending countries. Even 
with ideal data, statistical analyses will not lead to 
compelling evidence if theoretically relevant 
migration determinants are omitted in empirical 
models, or if models are based on the short term or 
only focus on one particular migration flow. This 
makes it impossible to study possible knock-on 
effects or what I have dubbed ‘substitution effects’ of 
one particular measure through the diversion of 
migration flows to other geographical, legal or illegal 
channels. 
In order to improve insights into the role of states and 
policies in migration processes, there is a need to 
embed the systematic analysis of policy effects into a 
comprehensive analytical framework of the sending- 
and receiving-country factors driving international 
migration. Although there is consensus that macro-
contextual economic and political factors and meso-
level factors such as networks all play ‘some’ role, 
there is no agreement on their relative weight and 
mutual interaction. How do migration policies 
precisely affect migration if we control for the many 
other factors that drive international migration? Or, to 
turn the question around: how do macro-level 
processes such as ‘development’, economic growth, 
demographic change, education, democratization and 
conflict in origin and destination countries affect 
migration independently from policy interventions? 
In other words, what are the constraints and relative 
margins within which migration policies can have an 
effect? 
Why has research on this issue hardly advanced over 
the past decades? A first problem is the rather weak 
connection between studies on migration policies and 
migration determinants on the one hand and 
fundamental research and theories on the causes of 
migration on the other. A second problem is that 
fundamental theoretical research on the nature and 
causes of migration processes has made relatively 
little progress over the last few decades (Arango 
2000; Massey et al. 1998). There is a plethora of 
research on the social, cultural and economic impacts 
of migration on sending and, particularly, receiving 
societies.  
In comparison, and with the possible exception of 
research on migration networks, there has been much 
less theoretically driven research on the nature and 
causes of migration processes themselves. This 
particularly applies to the study of the precise role of 
policies and states in migration processes. Other 
factors obstructing advances in research on migration 
determinants are data problems and unproductive 
divisions between, particularly economic and non-
economic, social science disciplines as well as 
qualitative and quantitative approaches. 
To start filling these research gaps, in this paper I aim 
to outline the contours of a theoretical and empirical 
research agenda for generating improved insights into 
the ways states and policies shape migration 
processes independently from and in their interaction 
with other migration determinants in receiving and 
sending countries. First, I will review existing, often 
disciplinary, theories on migration and I will argue 
how their fragmented insights can be integrated in 
one framework through conceptualizing virtually all 
manifestations of migration as a function of 
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capabilities and aspirations to migrate. Second, I will 
argue that considerable conceptual confusion can be 
removed if we distinguish the preponderant role of 
states in migration processes from the hypothetically 
more marginal role of specific immigration and 
emigration policies. Subsequently, based on a brief 
theorization of the role of states and policies in 
migration I will hypothesize four different 
‘substitution effects’ explaining migration policy 
failure, which can guide further research on migration 
determinants within and outside the context of the 
determinants of international migration project. 
2.1 MIGRATION THEORIES 
The preceding analysis has indicated that a robust 
analysis of the role of states and policies in migration 
processes is conditional on its sound embedding 
within a more general theoretical framework on the 
determinants of migration processes. Although there 
is a quantitative, generally econometrically oriented 
literature on migration determinants including some 
studies on the effect of policies, the literature is 
generally characterized by a conspicuous ignorance 
of insights from recent migration theories. Hence, 
migration determinants research is generally based on 
obsolete, theoretically void ‘push-pull’ and gravity 
models. 
Implicitly or explicitly, gravity and push-pull models 
are rooted into functionalist social theory. 
Functionalist social theory tends to see society as a 
system – or an aggregate of interdependent parts, with 
a tendency towards equilibrium. This perspective, in 
which people are expected to move from low-income 
to high-income areas, has remained dominant in 
migration studies since Ravenstein (1885; 1889) 
formulated his laws of migration. The idea that 
migration is a function of spatial disequilibria 
constitutes the cornerstone assumption of so-called 
‘push-pull’ models which still dominate much 
gravitybased migration modelling as well as 
common-sensical and non-specialist academic 
thinking about migration.  
Push-pull models usually identify various economic, 
environmental, and demographic factors which are 
assumed to push migrants out of places of origin and 
lure them into destination places. While deeply rooted 
in functionalist, equilibrium thinking, it is difficult to 
classify push-pull models a theory because they tend 
merely to specify a rather ambiguous list of factors 
that play ‘a’ role in migration. Push-pull models tend 
to be static and tend to portray migrants as ‘passive 
pawns’ lacking any agency which can perhaps be 
defined as the ability of people to make independent 
choices – to act or not act in specific ways – and, 
crucially, to alter structure and fail to conceptualize 
migration as a process. 
Neo-classical migration theory is the best known and 
most sophisticated application of the functionalist 
social scientific paradigm in migration studies. At the 
macro-level, neoclassical economic theory explains 
migration by geographical differences in the supply 
and demand for labour. At the micro-level, neo-
classical migration theory views migrants as 
individual, rational and income-maximizing actors, 
who decide to move on the basis of a cost-benefit 
calculation. Assuming free choice and full access to 
information, they are expected to go where they can 
be the most productive, that is, where they are able to 
earn the highest wages. Todaro (1969) and Harris and 
Todaro (1970) elaborated the basic twosector model 
of rural-to-urban migration, explaining migration on 
the basis of ‘expected income’ differentials. The 
initial Harris Todaro model for internal migration has, 
with some modifications, also been applied to 
international migration (Borjas 1989; Borjas 1990). 
Later modifications of the neo-classical model 
included the costs and risks of migration, and 
conceptualized migration as an investment in human 
capital in order to explain migration selectivity 
(Bauer & Zimmermann 1998; Sjaastad 1962). 
Neo-classical and other equilibrium migration 
models largely explain migration by geographical 
differences in incomes and wage levels (Harris and 
Todaro 1970; Lee 1966; Todaro 1969). Although it 
would be hard to deny that economic differentials 
play a major role in driving migration processes, this 
almost sounds more like a truism or assumption than 
a theory. Furthermore, this basic insight alone is 
insufficient to explain the strongly patterned, non-
random nature of real-life migration processes. For 
instance, these models have difficulties explaining 
return migration, migration in the absence of wage 
differentials and, particularly, adequately grasping 
the role of states, networks and other institutions in 
structuring migration. They also largely ignore non-
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economic migration drivers and typically fail to 
explain development-driven increases in migration. 
2.2 CONFLICT THEORY 
Other theories of migration reject the underlying 
functionalist assumption of conventional neo-
classical models that migration decisions are based on 
the rational cost-benefit calculation of income-
maximizing individuals operating in well-functioning 
markets. The new economics of labour migration 
(NELM) hypothesizes that migration, particularly 
under conditions of poverty and risk, is difficult to 
explain within a neo-classical framework. NELM 
conceptualizes migration as a collective household 
strategy to overcome market failures and spread 
income risks rather than a mere response of income-
maximizing individuals to expected wage 
differentials (Stark 1991; Stark & Bloom 1985; 
Taylor 1999). This gives considerable theoretical 
room to explain migration in the absence of 
significant wage differentials. NELM also argues that 
income inequality and relative deprivation within 
sending societies are major drivers of migration 
(Skeldon 2002; Stark & Taylor 1989). Through 
remittances, migration can also be a livelihood 
strategy used by families and households to raise 
investment capital if credit markets fail. Within a 
broader social scientific perspective, it is possible to 
reinterpret NELM as a theory that explains migration 
as an active attempt – an act of agency – by social 
groups to overcome structural constraints. An 
important methodological inference of these ‘new’ 
theories is that market access, income inequality, 
relative deprivation, and social security are important 
migration determinants, and need to be included in 
empirical models if possible. 
NELM-inspired migration theory seems particularly 
relevant for explaining migration in developing 
countries and other situations in which migrants face 
considerable constraint and risk, and therefore also 
seems applicable to ‘non-labour’ forms of migration, 
such as refugee migration. This points to a more 
general weakness of conventional ways of classifying 
migration into distinct types and the concomitant 
tendency to develop separate theories for them. This 
is deeply problematic, as these migration types reflect 
legal rather than sociological categories. These 
categorizations ignore empirical evidence that 
migration is typically driven by a range of contextual 
factors and that individual motivations to migrate are 
often mixed (Mannan & Krueger 2002).. This makes 
strict distinctions such as between voluntary and 
forced migration, or between family and labour 
migration, often deeply problematic. This seems 
certainly to be the case in the context of restrictive 
immigration policies, in which prospective migrants 
perceived policies as opportunity structures within 
which the choice of migration channel is likely to be 
based on relative ease and costs rather than on a 
consideration of which category best matches their 
‘genuine’ migration motives (Mannan & Kozlov 
2001). 
While some would still classify NELM as an 
amended form of neo-classical theory, a more 
profound critique of neo-classical and push-pull 
migration theories would stress their a-historical 
nature and their failure to conceptualize how macro-
structural factors such as states, policies, labour 
markets, status hierarchies, power inequalities and 
social group formation strongly constrain individual 
choice and explain why most migration tends to occur 
in socially selective and geographically strongly 
patterned ways; that is, along well-defined pathways 
or corridors between particular origins and 
destinations. Conventional economic models usually 
incorporate structural factors as additional costs and 
risks individuals face. It certainly does make sense to 
assume that structural constraints affect the cost-
benefit calculus and destination choice. However, the 
reduction of such factors to individual costs and 
benefits makes such models inherently blind to the 
very structural features of such factors, which can 
only be analysed on the group level as they are 
embedded in and reproduced by patterns of relations 
between people. Despite the considerable merits of 
neo-classical approaches, their methodological 
individualism largely inhibits them from capturing 
structural factors. 
At a more fundamental level, functionalist social 
theory can been criticized for being unable to explain 
growing disequilibria, structural power inequalities, 
social contradictions and the role of conflict in social 
transformation; as well as for its inability to 
conceptualize structure and agency. In contrast, 
‘conflict theory’, the social scientific opposite of 
functionalist/equilibrium theory, postulates that 
social and economic systems tend to reproduce and 
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reinforce structural inequalities and serve the interests 
of the powers that be, and that they can only be altered 
through a radical change in power structures through 
the organized (structured) resistance of oppressed 
groups. In other words, social transformation does not 
often come smoothly, and often requires collective 
action enabled by rising consciousness about one’s 
perceived oppression and one’s ability to overcome 
such oppression by peaceful or violent resistance 
(Collins (1994)). 
Within the general social-scientific paradigm of 
‘conflict theory’, Marxist, dependency, and world 
systems theory tend to see migration as the direct 
outflow of the spread of global capitalism and the 
related marginalization and uprooting of rural 
populations around the world who have no choice 
other than to migrate to cities to join the urban 
proletariat. Migration is therefore seen as a process 
that serves the interests of large corporations and 
specific economic interest groups and states that are 
strongly lobbied by these interests. These approaches 
can be criticized for being overly deductive and 
deterministic, with their concomitant portrayal of 
individuals as passive victims of economic macro-
forces. In other words, individual migrants are hardly 
attributed any agency and, as far as they act, they are 
supposed to make irrational choices. 
In order to explain why people behave in ways that 
go against their own objective, material interests, 
Marxist theory uses the concept of false 
consciousness, which can be defined as the ‘failure to 
recognize the instruments of one's oppression or 
exploitation as one’s own creation, as when members 
of an oppressed class unwittingly adopt views of the 
oppressor class’. The assumption that all or most 
migrants behave irrationally seems equally 
unrealistic as the full rationality and income-
maximizing assumptions of orthodox neo-classical 
models. For instance, it would be difficult to reason 
that the choices of refugees or unemployed graduates 
to emigrate are not rational to a considerable extent. 
Although few would still agree with the more 
orthodox versions of neo-Marxist theory in the face 
of ample empirical evidence pointing to the fact that 
poor people also exert a considerable amount of 
agency, it would also be naïve to deny that migration 
processes are to a significant extent determined by 
contextual factors, and that while individual choice is 
certainly not absent, it is considerably constrained by 
structural factors –facilitating migration of specific 
social groups along specific geographical and legal 
pathways while simultaneously impeding it for many 
others groups and along many other pathways. This 
seems particularly important for poor people with 
limited access to resources and markets and living in 
politically repressive environments. 
A powerful example of ‘structure’ – among several 
others – that appears to be particularly crucial as a 
migration determinant is the segmentation of labour 
markets. Dual labour market theory (Piore 1979) 
argued that international migration is mainly driven 
by pull factors, since the segmentation of labour 
markets creates a permanent demand for cheap 
immigrant labour at the bottom, ‘secondary’ end of 
the labour market to occupy jobs that ‘primary’ 
workers typically shun, primarily because of social 
status and relative deprivation motives. The latter 
exemplifies the deep socio-cultural roots of what 
superficially appears to be ‘just’ an economic 
phenomenon (Mannan & Kozlov 1995). Although 
this is a partial theory, that ignores sending-side 
explanations altogether and implicitly assumes a 
quasi-unlimited supply of migrant workers, its core 
argument is very powerful to explain the remarkable 
persistence of low-skilled migration to wealthy 
countries over the past half century as well as the 
coexistence of domestic unemployment and 
immigration: the demand for low-skilled migrants is 
sector-specific and has become structurally 
embedded in labour market structures and socio-
cultural hierarchies. 
In this context, Stephen Castles (2002) has argued 
that ‘it is one of the great fictions of our age that the 
“new economy” does not need “-D workers” any 
more’. He argued that industrialized counties 
continue to import unskilled labor, and that – in the 
absence of sufficient legal channels for low-skilled 
labour migration – this often takes the form of 
systematic use of irregular migrants or asylum 
seekers, whose very lack of rights makes them easy 
to exploit. Although the industries and mines in 
which low-skilled migrants worked have declined 
since the early 1970s, Saskia Sassen (1988) has 
argued that new internal and international divisions of 
labour have arisen, particularly in ‘global cities’, 
where the luxury consumption needs of the high-
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skilled have created new labour market demand, 
particularly in the lower skilled services, such as 
cleaning, childcare, restaurant work, gardening, but 
also in garment manufacture, construction, garment 
manufacture and food processing (Castles 2002). 
Further elaborating upon the work by Piore, Castles, 
Sassen and others, it is possible to theorize that, over 
development processes, labour markets have grown 
increasingly complex and multi-segmented while the 
general level and degree of specialization in 
education has increased. As the geographical expanse 
of labour markets typically increases as education 
goes up, increasing levels and complexity of 
education and labour markets seems to drive people 
to migrate in order to match supply and demand. This 
seems to be one of the main reasons why relatively 
wealthy and developed societies are inherently more 
mobile and migratory than relatively poor societies. 
Studying and comparing the structure of labour 
markets as well as concomitant differences in income 
inequalities and relative deprivation can also help us 
to further understand the occurrence of significant 
migration between regions or countries with similar 
average income levels. However, these hypotheses 
have remained largely untested. The methodological 
inference of these theoretical insights is that, in order 
to advance our understanding of the structural drivers 
of migration processes, there is a need to develop 
empirical approaches to assess the interrelated roles 
of labour market structure, education and skill 
structure, social fractionalization and relative 
deprivation in affecting the volume and, particularly, 
the social composition and the geographical 
patterning of migration flows. 
This example of labour markets exemplifies that, in 
order to explain real-world migration patterns, there 
is a need to go beyond gravity or push-pull 
approaches by looking beyond the level of ‘national 
averages’ such as GDP per capita and exploring the 
internal structure of societies and economies. This 
can partly be achieved through quantitative 
approaches, particularly through developing new 
indicators that capture key structural features such as 
inequality, relative deprivation (Stark &Taylor 1991), 
social security, and labour market structure. It goes 
without saying that all these factors are deeply 
affected by policies pursued by states. 
2.3 THE SENDING-COUNTRY APPROACH 
The weakness of labour market-based migration 
theories is that they focus on receiving country 
demand factors, and generally ignore how origin-
country factors such as labour market structure, 
income levels and inequalities, social security, 
conflict, states and public policies, affect migration. 
At best, labour market-focused migration theories 
assume a quasi-unlimited supply of migrant labour, 
which seems to be implicitly based on the naïve 
notion that high population growth, poverty and 
warfare in developing countries ‘push’ migrants to 
leave, thereby virtually reducing their agency to zero. 
This notion clearly conflicts with empirical and 
theoretical insights on the intrinsic relationship 
between migration and broader processes of 
development and social transformation (Hatton & 
Williamson 1998; Massey 1991; Skeldon 1997; 
Zelinsky 1971). The latter insights question the 
‘unlimited supply hypothesis’ and reveal a much 
more complex picture of how development processes 
affect migration and crucially undermine the 
assumptions underpinning conventional migration 
theories. 
For instance, conventional ideas that development in 
origin countries will reduce international migration 
are ultimately based on the assumption of ‘push-pull’ 
and ‘gravity’ models that there is an inversely 
proportional relationship between absolute levels and 
relative differences of wealth on the one hand and 
migration on the other. By contrast, another group of 
theories postulate that development leads to generally 
increased levels of immigration and emigration. 
‘Migration transition theory’ hypothesizes that 
constraints-loosening and aspirations-increasing 
economic and human development and parallel 
demographic transitions tend to have an inverted J-
curve or U-curve effect on emigration rates (Mannan 
& Kozlov 1997). This hypothesized non-linearity and 
the complexity of development migration linkages 
contrast with conventional theories and also compel 
us to design different, theoretically informed 
empirical approaches away from standard ‘push-pull’ 
and gravity models. 
More in general, the receiving-country bias of 
migration research points to the importance of 
advancing our theoretical understanding of the origin-
country determinants of migration processes at 
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different levels of aggregation. Social security and 
welfare spending is another example of a potentially 
crucial origin-country migration determinant. While 
there are several studies on the contested and 
questionable existence of a ‘welfare magnet’ effect 
on migration, this discussion is conspicuously biased 
towards destination states or countries, while there is 
reason to believe that factors such as social security 
matter equally if not more from an origin-society 
perspective. More generally, this example also shows 
the need to fully take into account the role of 
structural and institutional factors in origin societies 
in shaping migration processes. 
2.4 MIGRATION DETERMINANTS 
Conventional migration theories focus on how 
income and wage levels and, to a lesser extent, 
income inequalities affect migration processes. 
Although they might differ in their specification, they 
share a focus on economic differentials as the main 
driver of migration. This coincides with a research 
focus on labour migration and near-total separation 
from research on ‘forced’ or refugee migration. The 
implicit suggestion is that these different migration 
categories represent fundamentally different 
processes. There are many reasons to contest this 
view. After all, labels such as ‘labour’, ‘refugee’, 
‘family’ or ‘student’ migration primarily reflect legal 
categories, which are useful for administrative 
procedures, but are not very meaningful categories to 
help understand migration as a social process. For 
instance, the ‘voluntary’/‘forced’ migration 
dichotomy is simplistic because it assumes that one 
category of migrants enjoys total freedom and the 
other category has no choice or agency at all. 
The legal-bureaucratic categories frequently used in 
social scientific research conceal the fact that, on a 
macro-level, migration processes are driven by a 
multitude of economic and non-economic factors and 
that, on a micro-level, migrants are motivated by a 
combination of multiple, interconnected but 
analytically distinct social, cultural, economic and 
political factors. For instance, economic development 
is positively associated with democratization 
processes (Burkhart & Lewis-Beck 1994), and 
economic development and democratization are 
likely to affect migration processes simultaneously. It 
would be naïve to assume that refugees are also 
affected by economic and social considerations, 
certainly where destination choice is concerned. 
Likewise, ‘labour migrants’ are likely also to weigh 
personal freedoms in their migration decision-
making. And ‘family migrants’ are potential workers 
too. 
These few examples also show the need to look 
beyond specific policies, and to consider the nature of 
states. For instance, the position of states both on the 
authoritarianism-democracy and on the strong-weak 
central power continuums seems to be an important 
macro-structural determinant of migration processes, 
as both positions affect aspirations and capabilities to 
migrate and the extent to which states will desire and 
be able to ‘steer’ migration. There is also a clear need 
to differentiate between different types of freedoms 
as they are likely to affect migration in different ways. 
 
3.1 THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS 
The main challenge for advancing migration theory is 
how to synthesize the different migration theories 
developed across a range of social science disciplines 
– ranging from economics to anthropology. Faced 
with the daunting complexity and diversity of 
migration processes, migration scholars have often – 
and perhaps wearingly – argued that an all-
encompassing and all-explaining theory of migration 
will never arise (Salt 1987; Van Amersfoort 1998). 
Unfortunately, this probably sensible observation has 
coincided with a strong tendency to abandon 
theorizing migration altogether. Although migration 
is certainly a complex and apparently ‘messy’ 
process, this goes for virtually all social processes. 
Moreover, migration may be complex, but it is 
certainly not a random process. Instead, it is a 
strongly socially structured and spatially patterned 
process, in which strong regularities can be discerned. 
More generally, ‘all-comprehensiveness’ is not what 
social theory should be about in the first place. Social 
theory formation is precisely about striking a delicate 
balance between the desire to acknowledge the 
intricate complexities and the richness of social life 
on the one hand and the scientific need to discern 
underlying regularities, patterns and trends on the 
other. Theory formation is exactly about generalizing, 
which is a reductionist process by definition, where 
the exception may well prove the rule. Although it is 
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indeed naïve to assume that a one-size-fits-all theory 
explaining migration at all places and at all times will 
ever arise, there is undoubtedly more room for 
theorizing on migration processes and how they 
reciprocally connect to broader processes of social 
and economic change. 
Much can already be gained from developing a more 
unified social-scientific perspective on migration, in 
which unproductive disciplinary boundaries are 
broken down. In their seminal review of migration 
theories, Massey et al. (1993) rightly argued that the 
different theories on migration are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Because different disciplines use 
different jargons and methodological tools, they often 
seem irreconcilable, but below the surface they often 
study similar processes and causal links. Once 
conceptual confusion is resolved by debate, and 
sufficient openness is created to learn from other 
methodological approaches, a lot of the apparent 
contradictions turn out to be rather spurious, and 
cross-fertilization can enrich theoretical thinking. For 
instance, the new economics of labour migration 
(NELM), which is one of the major past advances in 
economic migration theory, was apparently inspired 
by research on household composition and livelihood 
strategies conducted by anthropologists and 
sociologists (Lucas & Stark 1985). Although there are 
marked differences between different theories, 
disciplines and associated research traditions, they 
are not necessarily incompatible, and there is 
considerable room to identify more common grounds 
and to create conceptual bridges. 
However, an eclectic ‘combining of insights’ cannot 
solve some more fundamental problems, particularly 
when theories have different paradigmatic roots. For 
instance, it seems impossible to merge neo-classical 
and neo-Marxist migration theories, because they 
differ in their most fundamental assumptions. For 
similar reasons, theoretical problems cannot be 
solved by simply ‘plugging in’ variables 
‘representing’ the different theories in the same 
regression equation, as is often the tendency. What is 
really lacking, and what is hindering theoretical 
synthesis, is a more comprehensive and convincing 
‘behavioural’ framework of migration than the 
current theories offer. The only systematically 
elaborated micro-behavioural model of migration is 
neo-classical. Although neo-classical migration 
theory has been much reviled for a number of more 
and less convincing reasons, no credible alternative 
has been proposed so far. 
Despite the enormous value of macro-level theories 
developed by sociologists, geographers and 
demographers, because of their very macro-level 
nature they often lack a ‘behavioural link’ to the 
micro-level. In other words, they do not make explicit 
the behavioural assumptions underpinning the macro-
level correlations they assume or describe. It would 
be to commit a classical ‘ecological fallacy’ to 
confound macro-level migration determinants with 
individual migration motives – which is exactly what 
the push-pull and non-expert literature on 
environmental change and migration typically does. 
After all, people do not migrate ‘because of’ abstract 
concepts such as demographic transitions, declining 
fertility, ageing, population density, environmental 
degradation or factor productivity. For instance, there 
may often be a correlation between demographic and 
migration transitions, but this does not make clear 
why people should necessarily migrate under 
conditions of high population growth. People will 
only migrate if they perceive better opportunities 
elsewhere and have the capabilities to move. 
Although this assertion implies choice and agency, it 
also shows that this agency is constrained by 
(historically determined) conditions which create 
concrete opportunity structures. 
Ultimately, in the social world, ‘causality’ therefore 
runs through people’s agency, producing outcomes 
on the aggregate level which can perhaps be 
measured through macro indicators. But any 
convincing macro-model should be underpinned by a 
credible micro behavioural link. The lack of micro-
behavioural foundation makes most macro-theories 
deterministic. In fact, the problem with the very term 
‘determinants’ is that it conveys a somehow 
deterministic picture of ‘causation from outside’, 
independent from migrants’ agency and internal 
migration dynamics. It seems therefore desirable to 
(re)define the concept of ‘determinants’ so as to 
include human agency, which has independent power 
to change social structures (Mannan & Krueger 
2000). 
Crucially, most macro-theories ignore agency. At the 
same time, neo-classical migration theory has a 
reductionist, mechanistic concept of agency. Hence, 
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what we need is a new and more realistic micro-level 
model or framework of migration. Such a framework 
should take into account empirical insights of decades 
of migration research from across a range of 
disciplines, but at the same time it should remain 
basic and parsimonious enough so as to fulfil its 
generalizing ambitions. Such a framework should 
specify the basic assumptions about the factors that 
make people decide to migrate (or not). Two further 
conditions need to be met: first, such a model should 
incorporate a sense of agency, and should not 
conceive migration as an almost ‘mechanistic’ 
response to a range of ‘pushes’ or ‘pulls’, or wage 
differentials. Ultimately, this is also the reason why 
gravity models normally used for trade cannot be 
assumed to be valid to model human migration. 
People are not goods. Goods are passive. People are 
humans, who make active decisions based on their 
subjective aspirations and preferences, so their 
behaviour is not just a function of macrolevel 
disequilibria, neither does their behaviour necessarily 
decrease these disequilibria (Mannan & Kozlov 
1999). Second, such a micro-model should 
incorporate a sense of structure, in the sense that 
migration behaviour is constrained by structurally 
determined resource and information limitations. 
This above analysis leads to the proposition that, in 
order to improve our insights into the factors driving 
migration, and to synthesize prior theories, an 
improved theoretical model of migration should: 
conceive migration aspirations as a function of spatial 
opportunity differentials and people’s life aspirations; 
and conceive migration propensities as a function of 
their aspirations and capabilities to migrate. These 
two basic assumptions about migration behaviour can 
serve as basic building blocks to build a theory of 
migration which synthesizes many existing 
theoretical and empirical insights. Although this still 
needs considerable theoretical elaboration in future 
work, such a conceptualization would allow us to: 
integrate economic and non-economic theories on 
migration and overcome ‘migration category’-based 
theorizing; integrate theories on so-called ‘voluntary’ 
and ‘forced’ migration; link micro- to macro-theories; 
and open new avenues for integrating agency and 
culture into migration theory. 
The conceptualization of migration as a function of 
opportunity rather than income or wage differentials 
compels us to study how social, economic and 
political conditions affect migration processes 
simultaneously. Improved empirical models should 
reflect this and would allow for the study of the 
relative importance of each of such factors as well as 
their mutual interaction. In an attempt to move 
beyond the artificial separation between economic 
and non-economic explanations, it seems useful to 
apply Amartya Sen’s (1999) capabilities approach to 
migration theory. In his book Development as 
Freedom, Sen (1999) defined development as the 
process of expanding the substantive freedoms that 
people enjoy. In order to operationalize these 
‘freedoms’, he used the concept of human capability, 
which refers to the ability of human beings to lead 
lives they have reason to value, and to enhance the 
substantive choices they have (Sen 1997: 1959). Sen 
stressed that freedom is central to the process of 
development primarily for its intrinsic, wellbeing-
enhancing power, which has to be clearly 
distinguished from the instrumental effectiveness of 
freedoms of in contributing to economic progress, 
which have been the usual benchmark to ‘measure’ 
development. 
Within this capabilities perspective, this study 
conceive human mobility as an integral part of human 
development for both intrinsic and instrumental 
reasons. First, people can only move if they have the 
capabilities to do so. Human mobility can be defined 
as the capability to decide where to live – and 
migration is the associated functioning. Expansions 
in this capability are an expansion of the choices open 
to an individual and therefore of their freedom. This 
is the intrinsic argument why mobility can be an 
integral part of human development. At the same 
time, movement can enable people to improve other 
dimensions relevant to their capabilities such as their 
income, their health, the education of themselves and 
of their children, and their self-respect. This is the 
instrumental value of mobility for development.  
This is why it is important to distinguish between the 
capability to move and the act of movement. In fact, 
some manifestations of migration are a result of the 
choices and freedoms of individuals becoming more 
restricted. So, enhanced mobility is not only the 
freedom to move – it is also the freedom to stay in 
one’s preferred location. Having choice to stay or to 
go, and where to go, captures the very essence of 
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agency. The application of a capabilities-focused 
conceptualization of development (Sen 1999) also 
creates conceptual room to fully include factors such 
as education, health, social security, various 
inequalities, and personal and political freedoms as 
migration determinants. It also creates room to 
broaden our view of freedom- and wellbeing-
generating resources to include not only economic, 
but also human and social resources or ‘capitals’. 
Another conceptual advantage of Sen’s perspective is 
that the notion of capabilities creates analytical room 
to start incorporating notions of agency in migration 
theory. The concept of agency is intrinsically linked 
to the power of social actors to affect processes of 
structural change. It is important to emphasize that 
agency can both sustain as well as alter processes and 
structural conditions (Emirbayer & Mische 1998). 
From this, migration itself can be conceptualized as a 
form, or expression of, agency, and not only a 
‘functionalist’ response to spatial differentials in 
economic opportunity. However, the extent to which 
social actors can exert agency is dependent on 
structural conditions which determine the space of 
manoeuvre within which individuals can make 
independent choices. Within the capabilities 
framework, the act of migration itself can be 
wellbeing-enhancing for the intrinsic value of the 
migration experience. Crucially, this enables us to 
incorporate manifestations of migration and mobility, 
where the experience itself is an important motive for 
moving, and the improvement of material 
circumstances plays a relatively minor role. As with 
tourism, through discovering new horizons and 
acquainting oneself with other cultures, in particular 
for young people, migration can have an intrinsic 
wellbeing-enhancing dimension. 
As a next conceptual step, and drawing on Isaiah 
Berlin’s (1969) concepts of negative and positive 
liberty, we can conceptualize capabilities as a 
function of positive and negative freedoms. Within 
Berlin’s perspective, negative liberty means the 
absence of obstacles, barriers or constraints. This 
comes close to classical ways of conceiving freedom, 
which are particularly focused on the role of states 
and politics in imposing constraints on people’s 
freedom or even being an outright threat to people’s 
lives. This concept of liberty is also the basis for the 
United Nations Refugee Protection regime, and 
international human rights organizations. Within this 
perspective, democracy, conflict prevention and 
promoting the rule of law are typically seen as ways 
to promote people’s freedoms and to prevent ‘forced’ 
migration. 
Berlin’s (1969) concept of positive liberty refers to 
the possibility or the fact of acting in such a way as to 
take control of one’s life and realize one’s 
fundamental purposes. This concept pertains to the 
agency of individuals and groups to change their life 
circumstances and to escape from disadvantaged 
positions. It is enshrined in international human 
rights8 and notions of ‘empowerment’ in 
development theory. Positive liberty embodies the 
notion that the absence of external constraint is not a 
sufficient condition for people to improve their 
wellbeing. This is a point that Amartya Sen has 
particularly stressed in his development theory. For 
instance, a given state might be formally democratic 
and there might be an absence of political 
persecutions, but illiterate and poor people generally 
lack the capabilities and resources to actually make 
use of such liberties. In other words, people need 
access to resources in the forms of social, human and 
material capital in order to exert their agency, such as 
the freedom to migrate or not to migrate. This reveals 
a fundamental paradox: although relative deprivation 
of freedoms and an awareness of better opportunities 
elsewhere may make people aspire to migrate, 
absolute deprivation of either negative or positive 
freedoms, or both, will prevent them from exerting 
such migratory agency. 
So, from a capabilities point of view, the very term 
‘forced migration’ is somehow an oxymoron, as 
people still need capabilities to be able to migrate. 
While deprivation of negative freedoms is likely to 
motivate people to migrate, they need a certain level 
of empowerment or access to positive freedoms in 
order to actually be capable of fleeing towards a 
particular destination. When people are deprived of 
both freedoms, they are generally forced to stay 
where they are. In conflict situations, the most 
deprived are typically the ones who are ‘forced to 
stay’. The concept of negative freedom is also useful 
for theorizing the role of immigration and emigration 
policies. Restrictive immigration policies can 
decreases people’s ‘negative freedoms’ to migrate, 
and can create situations of ‘involuntary immobility’, 
 
183 
 
a term aptly coined by Carling (2002). Such 
involuntary immobility can also occur under 
restrictive emigration policies.  
However, even under liberal migration policies where 
people may enjoy abundant negative freedoms, if 
they are deprived of the basic positive freedoms and 
access to social, human and economic resources, they 
will still be unable to migrate, particularly over larger 
distances. All of this helps to explain the paradox of 
why development often coincides with increasing 
levels of migration. From this, the author hypothesize 
that most emigration is likely to occur when people 
enjoy a maximum of negative freedoms and a 
moderate level of positive freedoms, as very high 
levels of positive freedoms and declining spatial 
opportunity differentials would somehow decrease 
their aspirations to migrate. This also shows why so-
called push-pull theories are fundamentally flawed: 
with the exception of extreme situations like slavery, 
people are not goods that can be passively moved: 
they need to move by themselves, and a fundamental 
precondition for that to happen is that they have the 
willingness and capabilities to do so. 
This brings in the concept of aspirations, which is a 
crucial element of this attempt at theoretical synthesis 
and, particularly, the attempt to better incorporate 
agency in migration theory. Conventional migration 
theories either totally disregard or have very 
reductionist notions of agency. Although within 
neoclassical and other functionalist migration 
theories, there is room for individual decision-
making, there is no genuine room for agency, because 
individual behaviour is a totally predictable, 
mechanistic outcome of wage and other opportunity 
differentials. The underlying assumptions are that 
people are free from constraints, enjoy full access to 
information, and make migration decisions with the 
aim of maximizing their utility. These are clearly 
unrealistic assumptions. Although mainstream 
economics and, to a certain extent, migration 
economics have come a long way to acknowledge 
information and market imperfections in their 
theories and models, the utility-maximizing notion 
underlying decision-making has not been 
fundamentally challenged. 
Here, it is important to observe that push-pull and 
gravity models as well as neoclassical and other 
functionalist migration theories implicitly assume 
that people’s preferences and, hence, aspirations are 
constant across societies and over time, and basically 
boil down to individual income maximization. In 
other words, people living in different societies, 
despite the huge variations in the amount and type of 
information and social, cultural and economic 
resources they can access, are somehow assumed to 
react in similar fashions to similar external stimuli or 
exogenously defined ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. This is 
what makes functionalist theory inherently 
mechanistic and their micro-models totally devoid of 
any real sense of agency, as individual choices are 
entirely predictable and human beings are, indeed, 
conceptualized to be ‘pulled’ and ‘pushed’ in space 
like atoms without their own will and ability to make 
independent choices and, herewith, affect structural 
change. Functionalist theory conceptualizes 
migration as an equilibrium- and system-reinforcing 
process. It therefore leaves no analytical room for 
either structural inequalities embedded in social 
hierarchies or migrants exercising agency.  
The crucial problem is that functionalist migration 
theory assumes that overall preferences are more or 
less constant across societies and over time. This 
ignores the fact that culture, education and access and 
exposure to particular forms of information are likely 
to have a huge impact on people’s notions of the good 
life and, hence, personal life aspirations; and their 
awareness and perception of opportunities elsewhere. 
If people do not aspire to other lifestyles ‘elsewhere’, 
even if they seem ‘objectively’ or ‘materially’ better, 
they will not translate this awareness into a desire to 
migrate. In fact, cultural ‘home preference’ seems to 
be a major explanation for why most people do not 
migrate. On the other hand, if migration-as-an-
experience is intrinsically seen as wellbeing-
enhancing, people might even voluntary opt for 
‘objectively’ less favourable circumstances. 
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that, 
in general, people’s personal life aspirations and 
awareness of opportunities elsewhere increase when 
levels of education and access to information improve 
in processes that are usually conceived as ‘human 
development’. If this coincides with the occurrence of 
significant differences in structurally determined 
spatial opportunity differentials, this is more likely to 
generate aspirations to migrate in an attempt to fulfil 
these life aspirations.. 
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Altogether, this yields a more comprehensive picture 
of behavioural causes of migration beyond the basic 
model of income-maximizing individuals reacting to 
wage differentials. Such an amended theoretical 
framework also helps us to re-conceptualize 
migration as an intrinsic part of processes of human 
development rather than the ‘outcome’ of 
development failure or a function of income and wage 
differentials or other externally given ‘push’ and 
‘pull’ factors. Conceiving migration as a function of 
capabilities and aspirations to migrate also gives us 
better, albeit certainly not perfect, conceptual tools to 
start incorporating meaningful notions of agency in 
theoretical models and empirical approaches. More in 
general, the simultaneous incorporation of agency 
and structure in migration theories remains one of the 
main challenges for advancing migration theory and, 
hence, the specification of more realistic empirical 
approaches.  
A key condition for incorporating structure and 
agency is to connect both concepts and to understand 
their dialectics. In this respect, ‘structure’ is often 
erroneously seen as a set of constraints, whereas in 
reality structures simultaneously constrain and 
facilitate agency. As we have seen, factors such as 
states and policies, economic and social inequalities 
as well as networks have a strong structuring effect 
on migration, which means that they are inclusive for 
some groups and exclusive for others, and that they 
strongly favour migration along certain geographical 
pathways while discouraging it along others. This 
typically leads to a rather neat social and geographical 
structuring and clustering of migration. 
So, the ensemble of structural conditions creates 
complex opportunity structures, endowing different 
individuals and social groups with different sets of 
negative and positive freedoms, which, depending on 
how these constellations affect their capabilities and 
aspirations, may or may not make them decide to 
migrate. In its turn, such agency will reciprocally 
affect these initial conditions through feedback 
effects, exemplifying the dialectics of structure and 
agency in migration processes. 
3.2 MICRO AND MACRO DETERMINANTS 
The challenge to link agency and structure is also 
related to the difficulties of linking micro level 
explanations of migration, which focus on how 
individual characteristics, access to resources, 
perceptions and preferences shape migration 
behaviour, to macro-level level theories which, 
ultimately, see migrants’ behaviour as a rather 
passive, and therefore rather predictable, outcome of 
given opportunity structures. In the literature it has 
been argued that meso-level theories on the formation 
of networks and migration systems provide this vital 
link (Faist 1997). The migration literature has 
identified various feedback mechanisms which 
explain why, once started, migration processes tend 
to become partly self-perpetuating, leading to the 
formation of migrant networks and migration systems 
(Mabogunje 1970; Massey 1990; Massey et al. 1998).  
Such feedback loops provide a powerful, concrete 
example of the dialectics between agency and 
structure, as they show how migrants create meso-
level structures such as networks and the ‘migration 
industry’ (Castles 2004a) that have a knock-on effect 
in reinforcing migration between particular places 
and countries through counter-flows of ideas and 
information (Mabogunje 1970), as well as decreasing 
the costs and risks of migration (Massey et al. 1998), 
thereby actively defying structural constraints such as 
high travel costs and restrictive immigration policies. 
This is a prime example of how migrants exert agency 
and are able to change initial structural conditions in 
such a way that they further facilitate migration along 
particular pathways. It is also a prime explanation of 
why states often find it difficult to control once-
started migration processes. These notions are crucial 
for theorizing the role of states and policies in 
migration processes. 
However, existing theories on these ‘internal 
dynamics’ of migration processes are characterized 
by some fundamental weaknesses which I reviewed 
in another paper. First, the usual focus on migrant 
networks coincides with a neglect of other feedback 
dynamics that operate through the impact of 
migration on the sending and receiving contexts 
(Mannan & Krueger 2004). Migration inevitably 
changes the initial structural conditions under which 
migration takes place in sending and receiving 
communities and societies, which, in their turn, 
reciprocally affect people’s aspirations and 
capabilities to migrate. Examples of such structural 
impacts include the impact of migration on income 
inequality and relative deprivation in origin societies, 
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the migration-facilitating role of remittances, and the 
rise of immigrant-dominated entrepreneurial sectors 
in destination countries, as well as the segmentation 
of labour markets along ethnic lines (Mannan & 
Kozlov 2003). Such processes contribute to the 
formation of migration systems – a set of places or 
countries linked by flows and counterflows of people, 
goods, services, and information, which tend to 
facilitate further exchange, including migration, 
between the places (Fawcett 1989; Kritz et al. 1992; 
Mabogunje 1970; Massey et al. 1998). 
Second, the largely circular logic of these theories 
reveals an inability to conceptualize which migration-
undermining feedback mechanisms may counteract 
migration-facilitating feedback dynamics and which 
may explain the endogenous decline of established 
migration systems. Theoretically, this can be 
explained by applying insights from the critical social 
capital literature pioneered by Portes (1998) and, in 
particular, the notion of negative social capital, to 
migration theories. Migrants do not necessarily help 
each other, and strong social ties and networks can 
also exclude non-group members. One of the 
methodological lessons is that empirical models 
should not just assume that the strength of network 
effects is a function of the size of migrant 
communities, as recent quantitative work tends to do. 
The relative importance of networks in facilitating 
migration crucially depends on the relative 
dependence on social capital among migrant 
communities. Moreover, positive network effects 
tend to decline over time. 
3.3 THEORIZING  
If anything, the above analysis points to the 
preponderance of structural factors such as economic 
and human development, labour market structure, 
social stratification, income inequalities, relative 
deprivation and social security, and the role of 
negative freedoms as well as positive freedoms in the 
form of access to material, social and human capital 
in shaping people’s capabilities and aspirations to 
migrate. This compels us to ask the following crucial 
question: within this broader whole of big forces and 
structural factors, and migrants’ considerable agency 
to shape and consolidate migration pathways and 
networks, what role is still left for migration policies 
pursued by states? Is that a comparatively marginal 
one, or do policies still play a key role? 
There is no simple answer to that question, first of all 
because the role of states and policies seems to vary 
according to the nature of the states, and is also 
dependent on the phase of migration system 
formation. The answer also crucially depends on 
whether we refer to the role of states in general or the 
role of specific migration policies. However, based 
on this theoretical framework it is possible to 
elaborate a few hypotheses. These are based on the 
notion that migration policies primarily affect 
negative freedoms in the form of the right to leave or 
enter a national territory, but that, primarily through 
non-migration policies (such as economic and 
education), states also affect people’s positive 
freedoms. While these factors affect people’s 
capabilities to migrate, factors such as repression and 
poverty affect people’s aspirations to migrate. 
First, the power of states to influence immigration 
and, particularly, emigration is much higher for 
repressive, authoritarian and centralized states than 
for liberal, democratic and decentralized states, which 
need to take more account of democratic processes 
and fundamental human rights. Second, we can 
hypothesize that states and policies often play an 
important role in the initiation of international 
migration, whether in the form of recruitment, visa 
requirements, colonialism, military occupation, or 
political repression (Entzinger 1985; Massey et al. 
1998; Penninx 1982; Skeldon 1997). On the other 
hand, it is important to emphasize that this is not 
always the case and that certain policies, such as 
recruitment, can also be an attempt to formalize 
already existing flows. 
However, once a certain number of migrants have 
settled at the destination, migration can become partly 
self-perpetuating (Castles 2004b; Massey 1990; 
Massey et al. 1998). The ‘internal dynamics’ of 
migration processes make additional movements 
more likely through various social, cultural and 
economic feedback mechanisms. According to 
migration systems theory (Mabogunje 1970), such 
mechanisms lead to almost organized migratory 
flows between particular regions and countries (Kritz 
et al. 1992; Portes & Böröcz 1987). In particular, 
migrant networks are believed to play a crucial role 
in facilitating continued migration over formally 
closed borders (Böcker 1994), which is a key 
example of how migrants’ agency and counter-
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strategies can actively undermine states’ attempts to 
control migration. 
Many migration scholars are therefore sceptical about 
the abilities of liberal democratic states to control 
migration. They argue that fluctuations in migration 
primarily respond to structural demand factors 
determined by human development, economic cycles, 
employment and changes in the structure of 
segmented labour markets; factors which largely lie 
beyond the reach of policy-makers. At the same time, 
migrant networks further facilitate migration along 
established pathways. Hence the assertion that 
‘borders are largely beyond control and little can be 
done to really cut down on immigration’ (Bhagwati 
2003). Other scholars have countered such scepticism 
by arguing that, on the whole, immigration policies 
have been largely effective (Brochmann & Hammar 
1999; Carling 2002; Strikwerda1999). 
However, this is partly a spurious disagreement. 
Considerable conceptual confusion can be reduced by 
clearly distinguishing the preponderant role of states 
in migration processes from the comparatively more 
marginal role of specific immigration and emigration 
policies. There can be no doubt that states can play an 
absolutely crucial role in shaping and transforming 
migration patterns (Brochmann & Hammar 1999; 
Skeldon 1997; Strikwerda 1999). Over the course of 
modern history, trends and patterns of migration have 
been intrinsically linked to processes of state 
formation and decline, economic and territorial 
imperialism and warfare. The very notion of 
international migration presumes the existence of 
national states and clearly defined territorial and 
institutional borders. The importance of factors such 
as economic and human development, labour 
markets, education and income inequalities points to 
the importance of non-migration policies, such as 
labour market, taxation, social welfare and foreign 
policies in indirectly affecting migration processes. 
From this, it is possible to hypothesize that state 
influence is primarily felt through general policies 
rather than migration policies per se, as the latter have 
a limited influence on the main determinants of 
migration. 
In the face of the dispute in migration research about 
the effectiveness of migration policy, it is important 
minimize conceptual confusion by clearly defining 
what constitutes migration policy and by 
distinguishing policy effectiveness from policy 
effects. Migration policies can be defined as laws, 
rules, measures, and practices implemented by 
national states with the stated objective to influence 
the volume, origin and internal composition of 
migration flows. The term ‘effectiveness’ refers to the 
extent to which policy objectives have been met, 
while the ‘effect’ just refers to the actual impact of a 
particular law, measure or regulation. This gives 
effectiveness a strong evaluative dimension. 
3.4 EFFECTS OF MIGRATION POLICIES 
The migration policy literature has argued that 
immigration policies frequently fail because they 
have several unintended, often counter-productive 
effects. Within the framework developed in this 
paper, migrants’ agency – in particular their creative 
ability to defy immigration rules by adopting new 
migration strategies and pathways – plays a key role 
in explaining such unintended effects. However, the 
existence and strength of such ‘perverse’ effects is 
highly contested, and therefore requires better 
empirical testing. It is reasonable to assume that 
migration policies, if implemented, must have some 
effect on migration. The crucial questions are: which 
effects, and what is the relative importance of these 
effects compared to other migration determinants.  
Recent reviews of immigration policies lead to the 
hypothesis that policies are more effective in 
determining the selection and composition of 
migration rather than the overall volume and long-
term trends of migration. However, the impact of 
policies on migration volumes of the particularly 
targeted category receive most if not all attention, 
which is unfortunate as the effects on other flows are 
crucial in understanding the structural and long-term 
effects of migration policies on overall migration 
flows. Based on the above analysis, I hypothesize that 
immigration restrictions can potentially lead to four 
main types of substitution effects which can reduce 
the effect of restrictions on inflows in the particular, 
targeted category: 
 Spatial substitution effects may occur 
through the diversion of migration to 
countries with less restrictive regulations for 
similar categories of migrants. There is 
some largely descriptive evidence observing 
such spatial substitution effects for asylum, 
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family and irregular migration to Europe and 
North America. In the Dutch language, such 
spatial substitution effects have also been 
dubbed as the ‘waterbed effect’ (Grütters 
2003; van der Erf 2003). 
 Categorical substitution effects may occur 
due to a reorientation towards other legal or 
illegal channels when entry through one 
particular channel becomes more difficult. 
For instance, it has frequently been argued 
that the lack of immigration channels for 
low-skilled labour migrants has compelled 
migration through family, asylum or student 
migration channels by people who basically 
migrated to work (Harris 2002; Massey 
2004) and that it has increased irregular 
migration (Castles 2004b). 
 Inter-temporal substitution effects or ‘now 
or never migration’ may occur if migration 
surges in the expectation of a future 
tightening of migration regulations. For 
instance, it has been argued that when the 
Federal Republic of Germany tried to 
discourage family reunification in the late 
1970s, family migration to the Federal 
Republic increased, since many migrants 
feared that, eventually, family reunification 
might be forbidden completely (Entzinger 
1985). There was a surge in Surinamese 
migration to the Netherlands in the 1970s 
around independence, and a surge in West 
Indian migration before 1962, when 
restrictions were introduced with the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act (Peach 
1968). Such effects have also been described 
for asylum migration (Grütters 2003). After 
the introduction of more restrictions, 
immigration typically shows a sharp fall. 
The long-term effect of such restrictions 
may thus be limited by the premeasure surge 
in inflows. 
 Reverse flow substitution effects occur 
when immigration restrictions decrease 
return migration flows. Several studies have 
argued that restrictive immigration policies 
discourage return migration and therefore 
push migrants into permanent settlement. 
This phenomenon has been described for 
Turkish and Moroccan ‘guest worker’ 
migration to north-west Europe, where 
many temporary workers ended up settling 
after the post 1973 recruitment ban (Böcker 
1994; Entzinger 1985). If migration 
restrictions decrease inflows but 
simultaneously also decrease return flows, 
their effect on net inflows becomes much 
more ambiguous. However, such hypotheses 
have not been subjected to empirical tests. 
Above four hypotheses about the unintended effects 
of policy restrictions need to be taken into account 
when measuring the effect of particular policies on 
migration flows. Decreases in restrictiveness are 
likely to have the opposite effect, and restrictive 
emigration policies can also have more or less similar 
spatial, categorical, inter-temporal and reverse flow 
substitution effects. As has been argued above, the 
danger of exclusively focusing on the particular 
inflow targeted by the policy is to over-estimate its 
effect. It is only by focusing on the effects of policy 
on overall migration flows through other spatial and 
legal channels and over a longer time period that a 
more comprehensive and methodologically valid 
picture can be obtained. 
Additional hypotheses can be elaborated on the 
policy effects of frequently used nonrestrictive policy 
instruments. Examples may include the oft-assumed 
‘pull effect’ of legalizations of irregular migrants, 
which have made such policies politically 
controversial. However, the existence of such pull 
effects has been contested based on descriptive 
quantitative analyses, indicating that this hypothesis 
needs proper testing. 
Another example is the effect of labour recruitment 
agreements. It has been argued that their effect is 
much lower than often hypothesized (Reniers 1999; 
Shadid 1979), but here also there is an absence of 
adequate, empirical tests. Besides measuring the 
direct effects of migration policies on the volume of 
flows within the migration category targeted by 
specific policies, empirical analyses within the 
determinants of migration project will focus on 
testing for these various substitution effects in order 
to acquire a more comprehensive empirical insight 
into the effects of migration policies. It goes without 
saying that empirical analyses will control for other 
theoretically relevant sending- and receiving-country 
migration determinants derived from the conceptual 
framework developed in this paper. 
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4.1 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, the author have argued that although the 
effectiveness of migration policies has been widely 
contested in the face of their supposed failure to steer 
immigration and their hypothesized counter-
productive effects, empirical evidence has remained 
inconclusive as a consequence of fundamental 
methodological and conceptual limitations. Although 
the general migration policy literature has yielded a 
rich set of hypotheses on possible policy effects, 
empirical evidence is mostly descriptive or anecdotal. 
At the same time, the migration determinants 
literature suffers from methodological problems and 
is largely based on obsolete and theoretically 
uninformed push-pull and gravity models, and is 
biased by omitting crucial sending-country, non-
economic and policy factors. The scholarly analysis 
of policy effects has remained under-theorized, and 
poorly connected to general migration theory. 
Because of this lack of precision and specification, it 
remains unclear how migration policies affect 
migration flows when other forces driving 
international migration are taken into account. Most 
empirical models miss out the ‘big picture’ by 
focusing on short-term fluctuations on particular 
migration flows and do not take into account the 
impact of policies on overall and long-term migration 
patterns and trends. More fundamentally, the 
contested nature of this debate reveals a still limited 
understanding of the forces driving international 
migration and the lack of theoretically driven 
research. Although there is consensus that macro-
contextual economic and political factors and meso-
level factors such as networks all play ‘some’ role, 
there is no agreement on their relative weight and 
mutual interaction. To start filling this gap, this paper 
outlined the contours of a conceptual framework for 
generating improved insights into the ways states and 
policies shape migration processes in their interaction 
with structural migration determinants in receiving 
and sending countries. 
This paper tried to argue that the current research 
impasse can only be overcome by firmly embedding 
the multi-method, longitudinal empirical analysis of 
policy effects into a more comprehensive theoretical 
framework of the macro and meso-level forces 
driving international migration. The author have 
argued that the fragmented insights from different 
disciplinary theories can be integrated in one model 
through conceptualizing virtually all manifestations 
of migration as a function of capabilities and 
aspirations to migrate and also proposed a set of 
hypotheses on perverse ‘substitution effects’ of 
migration policies which can guide future empirical 
research. 
However, the limited ability of prior research to 
assess the role of states and policies and migration 
processes is not only linked to theoretical problems, 
but also to concomitant methodological problems and 
important limitations. Nevertheless, from this paper it 
may already be clear that, in order to be tested, the 
key hypotheses about potential substitution effects 
require particular data and methodological 
approaches. First of all, spatial substitution effects 
can only be studied through ‘double comparative’ 
approaches which simultaneously study the migration 
of multiple origin groups to and from multiple 
destination countries. Such double comparative 
analyses require the availability of bilateral flow data. 
Also for studying inter-temporal substitution effects, 
a key requirement is the availability of bilateral flow 
data which preferably spans several decades. The 
theoretical relevance of reverse flow substitution 
effects reveals the need to consider immigration and 
emigration as separate social phenomena which 
require aggregate and, preferably, bilateral migration 
data that differentiate between outflows and inflows. 
The study of categorical substitution effects requires 
migration flow data which differentiate between the 
different migrant categories. 
However, it is important to emphasize that not all 
problems can be ‘fixed’ just by collecting better data 
and specifying better quantitative models. Ultimately, 
empirical research should be theory- and not data-
driven, and the point is that many theoretically 
relevant structural factors are indeed difficult to 
quantify. There are serious limitations in the 
availability of reliable indicators and it would also be 
naïve to assume that such indicators can capture all 
relevant dimensions of such structural features. 
Empirical quantitative models should be improved as 
much as possible. However, this cannot solve all 
problems, and the ‘non-quantifiability’ of certain 
factors should not be a reason to ignore them. 
To combine the different strengths of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches, methodological triangulation 
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seems to be a more promising avenue. Such an 
approach systematically combines formal 
quantitative tests of key indicators using panel 
datasets with detailed case studies studying the 
relation between transformations of economic 
structures and labour markets and migration patterns 
for particular countries or regional blocks. Such case 
studies should provide an empirically ‘thick’, 
informed description, supplemented, whenever 
possible, with exploratory quantitative analysis. This 
can serve to develop new ideas and hypotheses as 
well as a ‘plausibility-check’ of results generated by 
formal tests. 
Policy reviews should also include a qualitative 
assessment of the effects and effectiveness of these 
policies, from which hypotheses can be derived. 
Because much information on policies will be lost 
through quantification, the qualitative review and 
categorization of migration policies has a value in 
itself, and contributes to the improvement of the 
conceptual framework. Methodological heterodoxy 
and true interdisciplinary openness are therefore 
central conditions for advancing research on 
migration determinants. Through creatively 
integrating qualitative and quantitative approaches, it 
is possible to increase insights into the nature and 
evolution of migration policies and their effects on 
the size, direction, timing and composition of 
migration flows. Eventually, such an open, creative 
and flexible approach will enhance our ability to 
create a generalized theoretical understanding of the 
determinants of international migration. 
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